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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Deputy Assistant Director for Operations

DATE: 25 March 1952

FROM : P & C Staff

SUBJECT: OSI Paper on Russian Scientific Literature Problem

1. In view of the common OO/OSI interest in obtaining an NSCID for the intelligence exploitation of foreign "literature" and the basic similarity between their draft (which is limited to Russian, but not to scientific literature) and our draft, it seems that we should try to reach a compromise solution with OSI. Points on which we agree with OSI are:

a. That processing of foreign publications (indexing, abstracting, translating, etc.) for the purpose of the advancement of U.S. science and industry and the wide dissemination of such information for these purposes (outlined in the Turkevitch paper) is not an intelligence function and should not be performed by CIA. This Agency is interested in having it done by one outside agency (the National Science Foundation, the Library of Congress or Mr. Turkevitch himself) for three reasons:

(1) To use the abstracted and translated material for our own intelligence evaluations, and to spare our cleared linguists for work on classified materials.


(2) To give it to our consultants for more specialized evaluations.

(3) To get better-informed and educated consultants.

It seems that the over-all problem of the "free exchange" of scientific information; the need of USSR information by U.S. industry for preparation of counter-measures, and the general dissemination to the public of abstracts, translations, etc., is NOT the responsibility of the DCI to bring up to the President for action. In the scientific field, it should rest with RDB or some inter-service scientific committee (including the AEC) and it would be better for the DCI to get the RDB to go to the President than to go himself with this suggestion about the National Science Foundation. In addition, the DCI has an interest in protecting and preserving the flow of "open" USSR publications, and this might be jeopardized by a new and large-scale effort to exploit the available sources and tell everybody about them, even if the project were undertaken by a non-intelligence agency. The Soviets have already cut off the applied industrial publications (as OSI shows in their recent SI/261) and they might cut down on pure science publications if they realized their use by U.S. science and industry. The security aspects of the problem (which Turkevitch calls "ridiculous") need to be weighed against the advantages of such

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b. We also agree with OSI on the need for an NSCID and on the need for coordinating our efforts with those of other departments. We could subscribe to most of the separate points made in the OSI draft cover memo to the Executive Secretary of the NSC, (the first part of which talks about Russian scientific literature, Para 2 about all scientific literature, and Para 3 about Russian literature (apparently including economic, political, etc.) if the problems were dealt with logically and separately.

c. In the OSI Staff Study we could concur in Para 2 a, b, c, and possibly d—with reservations on the effects of the latter on the continued receipt of USSR material. All of these statements refer to USSR scientific material only. The following paragraphs are where OSI gets mixed up between scientific and non-scientific categories.



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Note: Points of non-concurrence and comments on the Turkeintch paper are attached.

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